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In this paper we provide two simple new versions of Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem, in a model with only one preference profile.  Both versions are transparent, 
requiring minimal mathematical sophistication.  The first version assumes there are only 
two people in society, whose preferences are being aggregated; the second version 
assumes two or more people.  Both theorems rely on assumptions about diversity of 
preferences, and we explore alternative notions of diversity at some length.  Our first 
theorem also uses a neutrality assumption, commonly used in the literature; our second 
theorem uses a neutrality/monotonicity assumption, which is stronger and less commonly 
used.  We provide examples to illustrate our points. 
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1.  Introduction. 
  In 1950 Kenneth Arrow (1950, 1963) provided a striking answer to a basic 
abstract problem of democracy:  how can the preferences of many individuals be 
aggregated into social preferences?  The starkly negative answer, known as Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem, was that every conceivable aggregation method has some flaw.  
That is, a handful of reasonable-looking axioms, which one thinks an aggregation 
procedure should satisfy, lead to impossibility:  the axioms are mutually inconsistent.  
This impossibility theorem created a large literature and major field called social choice 
theory; see for example,  Suzumura’s (2002) Introduction to the Handbook of Social 
Choice and Welfare, and  the Campbell and Kelly (2002) survey in the same volume.  
The theorem has also had a major impact on the larger fields of economics and political 
science, as well as on distant fields like mathematical biology.  (See, e.g., Bay and 
McMorris (2003).) 
  In this paper we develop two versions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.  Our 
models are so-called single-profile models.  This means impossibility is demonstrated in 
the context of one fixed profile of preferences, rather than in the (standard) Arrow 
context of many varying preference profiles.  Single-profile Arrow theorems were first 
proved in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s by Parks (1976), Hammond (1976), Kemp and 
Ng (1976), Pollak (1979), Roberts (1980) and Rubinstein (1984). 
Single-profile theorems were developed in response to an argument of Paul 
Samuelson (1967) against Arrow.   Samuelson claimed that Arrow’s model, with varying 
preference profiles, is irrelevant to the classical problem of maximizing a Bergson-
Samuelson-type social welfare function (Bergson (1938)), which depends on a given set 
  1of ordinal utility functions, that is, a fixed preference profile.  The single-profile Arrow 
theorems established that bad results (dictatorship, or illogic of social preferences, or, 
more generally, impossibility of aggregation) could be proved with one fixed preference 
profile (or set of ordinal utility functions), provided the profile is “diverse” enough. 
This paper has two purposes.  The first is to provide two short and transparent 
single-profile Arrow theorems.  In addition to being short and simple, our theorems do 
not require the existence of large numbers of alternatives.  Our second purpose is to 
explore the meaning of preference profile diversity.  Our first Arrow impossibility 
theorem, which is extremely easy to prove, assumes that there are only two people in 
society.  The proof relies on a neutrality assumption and our first version of preference 
diversity, which we call simple diversity.  In our second Arrow impossibility theorem, 
which is close to Pollak’s (1979) version, there are two or more people.  For this version 
we strengthen neutrality to neutrality/monotonicity, and we use a second, stronger 
version of preference diversity. 
  Other recent related literature includes Geanakoplos (2005), who has three very 
elegant proofs of Arrow’s theorem in the standard multi-profile context, and Ubeda 
(2004) who has another elegant multi-profile proof.  These proofs, while short, are 
mathematically much more challenging than ours.  Ubeda also emphasizes the 
importance of (multi-profile) neutrality, similar to but stronger than the assumption we 
use in this paper, and much stronger than Arrow’s independence assumption, and he 
provides several theorems establishing neutrality’s equivalence to other intuitively 
appealing principles.  Reny (2001) has an interesting side-by-side pair of (multi-profile) 
proofs, of Arrow’s theorem and the related theorem of Gibbard and Satterthwaite.   
  2 
2.  The Model. 
  We assume a society with   individuals, and 3 or more alternatives.   2 ≥ n
 A specification of the preferences of all individuals is called a preference profile.  In our 
theorems there is only one preference profile.  The preference profile is transformed into 
a social preference relation.  Both the individual and the social preference relations allow 
indifference.  The individual preference relations are all assumed to be complete and 
transitive.  The following notation is used:  Generic alternatives are x, y, z, w, etc.  
Particular alternatives are a, b, c, d, etc.  A generic person is labeled i, j, k and so on; a 
particular person is 1, 2, 3, and so on.  Person i’s preference relation is Ri.  xRiy means 
person i prefers x to y or is indifferent between them; xPiy means i prefers x to y; xIiy 
means i is indifferent between them.  Society’s preference relation is R.  xRy means 
society prefers x to y or is indifferent between them; xPy means society prefers x to y;  xIy 
means society is indifferent between them.  We start with the following assumptions: 
 
(1)  Complete and transitive social preferences.  The social preference relation 
R is complete and transitive.  
(2.a)  Weak Pareto principle.  For all x and y, if xPiy for all i, then xPy. 
(2.b)  Strong Pareto principle.  For all x and y, if xRiy for all i, and xPiy for some 
i, then xPy. 
(3.a)  Neutrality.  Suppose individual preferences for w vs. z are identical to 
individual preferences for x vs. y.  Then the social preference for w vs. z must be 
identical to the social preference for x vs. y.  More formally:  For all x, y, z, and w, 
  3assume that, for all i, xPiy if and only if wPiz, and zPiw if and only if  yPix.  Then 
wRz if and only if xRy, and zRw if and only if yRx. 
(4)  No dictator.  There is no dictator.  Individual i is a dictator if, for all x and y, 
xPiy implies xPy. 
(5.a)  Simple diversity.  There exists a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that xPiy 
for all i, but opinions are split on x vs. z, and on y vs. z.  That is, some people 
prefer x to z and some people prefer z to x, and, similarly, some people prefer y to 
z and some people prefer z to y. 
  
Note that we have two alternative versions of the Pareto principle here.  The first 
(weak Pareto) is more common in the Arrow’s theorem literature (e.g., see Campbell and 
Kelly (2002), p. 42).  We will use the strong Pareto principle in our n = 2 impossibility 
theorem below, and the weak Pareto principle in our   impossibility theorem.  
Neutrality, assumption 3.a, and simple diversity, assumption 5.a, are so numbered 
because we will introduce alternatives later. 
2 ≥ n
Also note that the no dictator assumption is different in a world with a single 
preference profile from what it is in the multi-profile world.  For example, in the single-
profile world, if all individuals have the same preferences, and if Pareto holds (weak or 
strong), then by definition everyone is a dictator.  Or, if individual i is indifferent among 
all the alternatives, he is by definition a dictator.  We will discuss this possibility of 
innocuous dictatorship in section 9 below.  
 
 
  43.  Some Examples in a 2-Person Model. 
  We illustrate with a few simple examples.  For these there are 2 people and 3 
alternatives, and we assume no individual indifference between any pair of alternatives.  
Given that we aren’t allowing individual indifference, the two Pareto principles collapse 
into one.  Preferences of the 2 people are shown by listing the alternatives from top (most 
preferred) to bottom (least preferred).  In our examples, the last column of the table 
shows what is being assumed about society’s preferences.  The comment below each 
example indicates which desired property is breaking down.  The point of these examples 
is that if we are willing to discard any 1 of our 5 basic assumptions, the remaining 4 may 
be mutually consistent. 
 
Person 1 Person 2
Society 
(Majority Rule)
Example 1  a c   
  b  a  aPb, aIc & bIc 
  c b   
Breakdown:  Transitivity for social preferences fails.  Transitivity for R implies 
transitivity for I.  This means aIc & cIb should imply aIb.  But we 
have aPb. 
  Person 1 Person 2 Society
Example 2  a c   
  b a  aIbIc 
  c b   
Breakdown:  Pareto (weak or strong) fails, because aP1b & aP2b should imply 
aPb.  But we have aIb. 
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  Person 1 Person 2 Society
Example 3  a c  a 
  b a  c 
  c b  b 
Breakdown:  Neutrality fails.  Compare the social treatment of a vs. c, where the 
two people are split and person 1 gets his way, to the social 
treatment of b vs. c, where the two people are split and person 2 gets 
his way. 
 
Person 1 Person 2
Society 
(1 is Dictator)
Example 4  a c  a 
  b a  b 
  c b  c 
Breakdown:  There is a dictator. 
 
Note that examples 1 through 4 all use the same profile of individual preferences, 
which satisfies the simple diversity assumption.  The next example modifies the 
individual preferences: 
 
Person 1 Person 2
Society 
(Majority Rule)
Example 5  a c   
  c a aIc 
  b b  aPb & cPb 
Breakdown:  Simple diversity fails.  Opinions are no longer split over two pairs of 
alternatives. 
 
4.  Neutrality, Independence, and Some Preliminary Arrow Paradoxes. 
  One of the most controversial of Arrow’s original assumptions was independence 
of irrelevant alternatives.  We did not define it above because it does not play a direct role 
  6in single-profile Arrow theorems; however it lurks behind the scenes.  Therefore we 
define it at this point.  Arrow’s independence requires the existence of multiple 
preference profiles, and to accommodate multiple profiles, we will use primes:  Person i’s 
preference relation was shown as i R  above, and society’s as R ; at this point we will write 
i R′ and R′ for alternative preferences for person i and society, respectively.  Arrow’s 
independence of irrelevant alternatives condition is as follows: 
 
(6)  Independence.  Let   and  12 , ,... RR R  be one set of individual and social 
preference relations and  12 , ,... RR ′ ′  and R′ be another.  Let x and y be any pair of 
alternatives such that the unprimed individual preferences for x vs. y are identical 
to the primed individual preferences for x vs. y.  Then the unprimed social 
preference for x vs. y must be identical to the primed social preference for x vs. y.   
 
Note the parallel between the independence assumption and the neutrality assumption. 
Independence requires multiple preference profiles whereas our version of neutrality 
assumes there is one preference profile.  Independence focuses on a pair of alternatives 
and switches between two preference profiles, one unprimed and the other primed.  It 
says that if the x vs. y individual preferences are the same under the two preference 
profiles, then the x vs. y unprimed social preference must be the same as the x vs. y 
primed social preference.  This statement is of course meaningless if there is only one 
preference profile.  The closest analogy when there is only one preference profile is 
neutrality, which says that if individual preferences regarding x vs. y under the one fixed 
preference profile are the same as  individual preferences regarding w vs. z under that 
  7profile, then the x vs. y social preference  must be the same as the w vs. z social 
preference. 
  In short, in a single-profile model, independence is a vacuous assumption, and its 
natural replacement is neutrality. 
  This natural replacement, however, prompted Samuelson (1977) to launch a 
colorful (if not intemperate) attack directed at the Kemp’s and Ng’s (1976) neutrality 
assumption.  Samuelson (1977) called neutrality, among other things, “anything but 
‘reasonable’,” “gratuitous,” having a “spurious appearance of reasonableness,” 
“abhorrent from an ethical viewpoint,”  “monstrously ‘unreasonable’,” and so on. He 
offered the following reductio ad absurdum example: 
 
Samuelson’s Chocolates.  There are two people.  There is a box of 100 
chocolates to be distributed between them.  They both like chocolates, and each is 
hungry enough to eat them all.  The alternatives are, say,  0 (100,0) x = , 
,  , etc., where the first number is the number of chocolates 
going to person 1, and the second is the number going to person 2. 
1 (99,1) x = 2 (98,2) x =
  Many ethical observers, looking at this society, would say that  1 x  is better 
than  0 x .  That is,  10 x Px .  That is, it would be good thing to take a chocolate from 
person 1, when he has 100 of them, and give it to person 2. 
  But now, by repeated applications of neutrality,  100 k x Px  for any  !  
That is, society should give all of the chocolates to person 2! 
100 k <
 
  8  Samuelson’s chocolates example is a vivid attack on neutrality, but should not be 
viewed as a compelling reason to drop it.  One response to the example is to say society 
should not decide that  1 x  is better than  0 x  in the first place; if society simply found  0 x  
and  1 x  equally good (contrary to the instincts of the chocolate redistributionist), 
neutrality would have implied that all the x’s are socially indifferent.  This would have 
been perfectly logical.  Another response is to observe that neutrality is a property of 
extremely important and widely used decision-making procedures, particularly majority 
voting, and therefore cannot be lightly dismissed. In fact, any social decision procedure 
that simply counts instances of i xPy,  i yPx,  i xIy, but does not weigh strength of feelings, 
satisfies neutrality. 
  Samuelson (1977) also offered a graphical argument against Arrow’s theorem 
with neutrality, an argument that was simplified and improved years later by Fleurbaey 
and Mongin (2005), as follows: 
 
Fleurbaey and Mongin Graphical Arrow Impossibility Argument.  Assume 
there are two people, and some set of alternatives  ,, x yz  and so on.  Assume the 
individuals have utility functions   and  , so  , for example, represents 
person 1’s utility level from alternative x.  
1 u 2 u 1() ux
  Consider the following graph: 







Utility levels of individuals 1 and 2 are on the horizontal and vertical axes, 
respectively.  Each alternative shows up in the graph as a utility pair, for instance 
 represents alternative  .  We start at  and draw 
horizontal and vertical lines through it, creating 4 quadrants. 
12 () ( () , () ) uz u z u z = z () uz
Now assume complete and transitive social preferences, strong Pareto and 
neutrality.  Take two alternatives, say  x and y , whose utility vectors are within 
the south-east quadrant.  Choose them so that   is northeast of  .  () ux () uy
Society cannot be indifferent between z  and  x for the following reasons:  
First, by neutrality, if society were indifferent between   and  z x, it would also 
have to be indifferent between z  and  .  Second, if it were indifferent between 
 and 
y
z x, and between  z  and  , by transitivity it would have to be indifferent 
between 
y
x and  . But third, since   is northeast of  , society must prefer  y () ux () uy
x to   by Pareto.  y
  10Therefore either society prefers   to  z x, or society prefers  x to  .  
Suppose the social preference is 
z
x over  .  Consider another alternative  .  By 
neutrality, if   is in the northwest quadrant, society must prefer   to  .  By 
strong Pareto, if   is in the northeast quadrant, society must prefer    to  .  
By strong Pareto, if   is in the southwest quadrant, society must prefer   to 
.  But this argument establishes that social preferences are always exactly the 
same as person 1’s; that is, person 1 is a dictator.  Had we started out by assuming 
the social preference is   over 
z w
() uw z w
() uw w z
() uw z
w
z x, person 2 would have been the dictator.  In 
short, the graph produces an Arrow impossibility. 
 
  There are two drawbacks to the Fleurbaey/Mongin/(Samuelson) graphical 
impossibility argument.  First, it has the disadvantage that it requires the use of the utility 
functions   and  , and it is cleaner to dispense with utility functions and simply use 
preference relations for individuals.  Second, it incorporates a crucial diversity 
assumption without being explicit about it.   Assuming the existence of the triple of utility 
vectors  ,  , and  , with their respective locations in the utility diagram, is in 
fact exactly the assumption of simple diversity:  both 1 and 2 prefer x to y, but opinions 
are split on x vs. z and opinions are split on y vs. z.  In our Arrow impossibility theorem 1 
below we make this assumption explicit. 
1 u 2 u
( ) ux ( ) uy ( ) uz
 
5.  Arrow Impossibility Theorem 1, n = 2. 
  We are ready to turn to our own simple version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, 
in the single-profile model.  Throughout this section, we assume n = 2.  We will show 
  11that our 5 assumptions, complete and transitive social preferences, strong Pareto, 
neutrality, simple diversity, and no dictator, are mutually inconsistent. 
First we establish proposition 1, which is by itself a very strong result.  This 
proposition corresponds to Samuelson’s chocolates example, and so we call it 




Samuelson’s Chocolates Proposition 1:   Assume n = 2.  Assume the strong 
Pareto principle, and neutrality.  Suppose for some pair of alternatives x and y, 
xPiy and yPjx.  Suppose that xPy.  Then person i is a dictator. 
Proof:  Let w and z be any pair of alternatives.  Assume wPiz.  We need to show 
that wPz must hold.  If wRjz, then wPz by strong Pareto.  If not wRjz, then zPjw by 
completeness for j’s preference relation, and then wPz by neutrality.  QED.  
 
Arrow Impossibility Theorem 1:  Assume n = 2.  The assumptions of complete 
and transitive social preferences, strong Pareto, neutrality, simple diversity, and 
no dictator are mutually inconsistent. 
Proof:  By simple diversity there exist x, y and z such that xPiy for i = 1, 2, but 
such that opinions are split on x vs. z, and on y vs. z. 
  Now xPy by the Pareto principle, weak or strong.   Since opinions are split 
on x vs. z, one person prefers x to z, while the other prefers z to x.  If xPz, then the 
                                                 
1 In our theorem we are using strong Pareto and neutrality to get impossibility.  With an almost identical 
proof we could substitute weak Pareto and neutrality/monotonicity, where neutrality/monotonicity is a 
strengthened version of neutrality, to be discussed below. 
  12person who prefers x to z is a dictator, by proposition 1.  If zPx, then the person 
who prefers z to x is a dictator, by proposition 1.   
  Suppose then that xIz.  Then zIx.  By transitivity, zIx and xPy implies zPy.  
But opinions are split on y vs. z.  Therefore one person prefers z to y, and the other 
person prefers y to z.  By proposition 1, the person who prefers z to y is a dictator.  
We have shown that whatever the social preference for x and z might be, there 
must be a dictator.  QED. 
 
6.  Trying to Generalize to an n-Person Model. 
  In what follows we seek to generalize our version of Arrow’s theorem to societies 
with arbitrary numbers of people.  From this point on in the paper we assume  .  In 
order to get an impossibility theorem when  , we need to strengthen some of our 
basic assumptions.  We start with the neutrality assumption.  We will strengthen it to a 
single-profile version of what is called neutrality/monotonicity.  (See Blau & Deb (1977), 
who call the multi-profile analog “full neutrality and monotonicity”; Sen (1977), who 




 (3.b)  Neutrality/monotonicity.  Suppose the support for w over z is as strong or 
stronger than the support for x over y, and suppose the opposite support, for z over 
w, is as weak or weaker than the support for y over x.   Then, if the social 
preference is for x over y, the social preference must also be for w over z.  More 
formally:  For all x, y, z, and w, assume that for all i, xPiy implies wPiz, and that 
for all i, zPiw implies yPix.  Then xPy implies wPz.  
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 Does this strengthening of the neutrality assumption, by itself, give us an Arrow 
impossibility theorem when  ?  The answer is No.  In example 6 below there are 3 
people and 4 alternatives, a, b, c and d.  The preferences of individuals 1, 2 and 3 are 
shown in the first 3 columns of the table.  The fourth column shows social preferences 




Person 1 Person 2 Person 3
Society 
(Majority Rule)
Example 6  a c  a  a 
  b a  c  c 
  c b  d  b 
  d d  b  d 
Breakdown:  None.  The complete and transitive social preferences 
assumption is satisfied, as are Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, 
simple diversity, and no dictator.  Majority rule works fine.  
There is no Arrow impossibility. 
 
Example 6 shows that when   there is no Arrow impossibility, under the assumptions 
of complete and transitive social preferences, Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, simple 
diversity, and no dictator. 
2 ≥ n
 
7.  Diversity. 
  In this section we will modify the diverse preferences assumption. 
  Before doing so, let’s revisit the assumption in the n = 2 world.   In that world, 
simple diversity says there must exist a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that xPiy for i = 
1, 2, but such that opinions are split on x vs. z and on y vs. z.  That is, one person prefers x 
  14to z, while the other prefers z to x, and one person prefers y to z, while the other prefers z 
to y.  Given our assumption that individual preferences are transitive, it must be the case 
that the two people’s preferences over the triple can be represented as follows: 
Simple diversity array, n = 2.  





Note that this is exactly the preference profile pattern of examples 1, 2, 3 and 4.   The 
reader familiar with social choice theory may recognize the preferences in this table as 
being two thirds of the Condorcet voting paradox preferences, as shown below: 
Condorcet voting paradox array. 
Person i Person j  Person k
x z y 
y x z 
z y x 
   
A similar array of preferences is used by Arrow in the proof of his impossibility 
theorem (e.g. Arrow (1963), p. 58), and by many others since, including Feldman & 
Serrano (2006), p. 294.  For the moment, assume V is any non-empty set of people in 
society, that V
C is the complement of V, and that V is partitioned into two non-empty 
subsets V1 and V2.  (Note that V
C  may be empty.)  The standard preference array used in 
many versions of Arrow’s theorem looks like this: 
 
 
  15Standard Arrow array. 
People in V1 People in V2 People  in  V
C
x z  y 
y x  z 
z y  x 
 
Now, let’s return to the question of how to modify the diverse preferences 
assumption.  Example 6 shows that we cannot stick with the simple diversity array and 
still get an impossibility result.  We might start with the Condorcet voting paradox array, 
but if  , we would have to worry about the preferences of people other than i,  j and 
k.  That suggests using something like the standard Arrow array.  However, assuming the 
existence of a triple x, y, and z, and preferences as per that array, for every subset of 
people V and every partition of V, is an unnecessarily strong diversity assumption. 
4 ≥ n
An even stronger diversity assumption was in fact used by Parks (1976), Pollak 
and other originators of single-profile Arrow theorems.  Pollak (1979) is clearest in his 
definition.  His condition of “unrestricted domain over triples” requires the following:  
Imagine “any logically possible sub-profile” of individual preferences over 3 
“hypothetical” alternatives x, y and z.  Then there exist 3 actual alternatives a, b and c for 
which the sub-profile of preferences exactly matches that “logically possible sub-profile” 
over x, y and z.   We will call this Pollak diversity.  Let us consider what this assumption 
requires in the simple world of strict preferences, 2 people, and 3 alternatives.  Pollak 
diversity would require that every one of the following arrays be represented, somewhere 
in the actual preference profile of the two people over the actual alternatives: 
 
  16Pollak diversity arrays, n = 2.  
1 2     1 2     1 2     1 2     1 2     1 2  
x x  x  x  x  y  x  y  x z  x z 
y y  y  z  y  x  y z  y  x  y  y 
z  z    z y   z z    z x   z y   z x 
   
Note that the number of arrays in the table above is 3! = 6.  If n were equal to 3 
we would have triples of columns instead of pairs, and there would have to be (3!)
2 = 36 
such triples.  With n people, the number of required n-tuples would be (3!)
n-1.    In short, 
the number of arrays required for Pollak diversity rises exponentially with n.  The 
number of alternatives rises with the number of required arrays, although not as fast 
because of array overlaps.  Parks (1976) uses an assumption (“diversity in society”) that 
is very similar to Pollak’s, although not so clear, and he indicates that it “requires at least 
3
n alternatives...”  
We believe Pollak diversity is much stronger than necessary, and we will proceed 
as follows.  We will not assume the existence of a triple x, y and z to give every 
conceivable array of preferences on that triple.  We will not even assume a triple x, y and 
z to give every possible array for given V, V1, V2, and V
C, as per the description of the 
standard Arrow array.  We will only assume the existence of the required Arrow-type 
triple, and we will only assume that much when the Arrow array matters.  For the 
purposes of our proof, the Arrow array assumption only matters if V is a decisive set. 
We say that a set of people V is decisive if it is non-empty and if, for all 
alternatives x and y, if xPiy for all i in V, then xPy.  
It is appropriate to make a few comments about the notion of decisiveness.  First, 
note that if person i is a dictator, then i by himself is a decisive set, and any set containing 
  17i is also decisive.  Also, note that the Pareto principle (weak or strong) implies the set of 
all people is decisive.  Second, in a multi-preference profile world, decisiveness for V 
would be a far stronger assumption that it is in the single-profile world, since it would 
require that (the same) V prevail no matter how preferences might change.  We only 
require that V prevail under the given fixed preference profile. 
Our diversity assumption is now modified as follows: 
 
(5.b)  Complex diversity.  For any decisive set V with 2 or more members, there 
exists a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that xPiy for all i in V; such that yPiz and 
zPix for everyone outside of V; and such that V can be partitioned into non-empty 
subsets V1 and V2, where the members of V1 all put z last in their rankings over the 
triple, and the members of V2 all put z first in their rankings over the triple. 
 
The assumption of complex diversity means that for a decisive set V with 2 or 
more members, there is a triple x, y, and z, and a partition of V, which produces exactly 
the standard Arrow array shown above. 
Simple diversity and complex diversity are related in the following way:  If n = 2 
and weak Pareto holds, they are equivalent.  If n > 2, neither one implies the other, but 
they are both implied by Pollack diversity. 
  Referring back to example 6 of the previous section, consider persons 2 and 3.  
Under simple majority rule, which was assumed in the example, they constitute a 
decisive coalition.  However the complex diversity assumption fails in the example, 
  18because there is no way to define the triple x, y, z so as to get the standard Arrow array, 
when V = {2, 3}.  Therefore complex diversity rules out that example. 
  Example 7 below modifies example 6 so that, for the decisive set V = {2, 3}, the 
preference profile is consistent with complex diversity.  (This example is created from 
example 6 by switching alternatives a and b in person 3’s ranking.  Let V1  = {2}, V2 = 
{3}, and V
C  = {1}.  The triple x, y, z is now c, a, b.)  Now that preferences have been 
modified consistent with our new diversity assumption, an Arrow impossibility pops up. 
 
Person 1 Person  2 Person  3 
Society 
(Majority Rule) 
Example 7  a c  b   
  b  a  c  aPb, bPc, cPa 
  c  b  d  aPd, bPd, cPd 
  d d  a   
Breakdown: Transitivity  for  social preferences fails, with a P cycle among 
a,b,c . 
 
Example 7 could be further modified by dropping alternative d, in which case it would 
become the Condorcet voting paradox array.  It would then have 3 people and 3 
alternatives, and would satisfy complex diversity.  Recall that Pollack diversity in the 3 
person case would require at least 36 n-tuples of alternatives, and that Parks diversity 
would require at least   alternatives.  The point here is that that complex diversity 







  198.  Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem 2,  .  2 ≥ n
We now proceed to a proof of our second single-profile Arrow’s theorem, which, 
unlike our first proof, is not restricted to a 2-person society.
2  Although Pollak made a 
much stronger diversity assumption than we use, and although Parks (1976), Hammond 
(1976), and Kemp and Ng (1976), preceded Pollak with single-profile Arrow theorems, 
we will call this the Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem, because of the similarity of our 
proof to his.  But first, we need a proposition paralleling proposition 1:  
  
Proposition 2:  Assume  , and neutrality/monotonicity.  Assume there is a 
non-empty group of people V and a pair of alternatives x and y, such that xP
2 ≥ n
iy for 
all i in V and yPix for all i not in V.  Suppose that xPy.  Then V is decisive. 
Proof:  This follows immediately from neutrality/monotonicity.  QED.  
 
Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem 2:  Assume  .  The assumptions of 
complete and transitive social preferences, weak Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, 
complex diversity, and no dictator are mutually inconsistent. 
2 ≥ n
Proof:  By the weak Pareto principle, the set of all individuals is decisive.  
Therefore decisive sets exist.  Let V be a decisive set of minimal size, that is, a 
decisive set with no proper subsets that are also decisive.  We will show that there 
is only one person in V, which will make that person a dictator.  This will 
establish Arrow’s theorem. 
  Suppose to the contrary that V has 2 or more members.  By the complex 
diversity assumption there is a triple of alternatives x, y, and z, and a partition of V 
                                                 
2 There is a similar proof, but for a for a multi-profile Arrow’s theorem, in Feldman & Serrano (2006). 
  20into non-empty subsets V1 and V2, giving the standard Arrow array as shown 
above.  Since V is decisive, it must be true that xPy.  Next we consider the social 
preference for x vs. z. 
  Case 1.  Suppose zRx.  Then zPy by transitivity.  Then V2 becomes 
decisive by proposition 2 above.  But this is a contradiction, since we assumed 
that V was a decisive set of minimal size. 
  Case 2.  Suppose not zRx.  Then the social preference must be xPz, by 
completeness.  But in this case V1 is getting its way in the face of opposition by 
everyone else, and by proposition 2 above V1 is decisive, another contradiction.  
QED. 
 
9.  Innocuous Dictators. 
  In the standard multi-profile world, where all preference profiles are allowed (the 
so-called “universality,” or “full domain” assumption) a dictator is a very bad thing 
indeed.  A dictator in such a world forces his (strict) preference for x over y even if 
everyone else prefers y over x.  In our single-profile world, on the other hand, a dictator 
may be innocuous.  For instance, if person i is indifferent between all pairs of 
alternatives, he is by definition a dictator, although a completely benign one.  Or, if 
everyone has exactly the same preferences over the alternatives, and weak Pareto is 
satisfied, then every one is a dictator.  Or, if in a committee of 5 people, 3 have identical 
preferences, and if they use majority rule, then the 3 with identical preferences are all 
dictators.  (Note however that in a standard median voter model, the median voter is not 
necessarily a dictator.  While his favorite alternative may be the choice of the committee, 
  21the committee’s preferences over all pairs of alternatives will not necessarily agree with 
his preferences over those pairs of alternatives.)  
  Therefore we need to make a few final comments about why dictatorship should 
worry us, even though some dictators are innocuous.  First, while we assume a single-
profile world in this paper, and while for certain given profiles dictatorship doesn’t look 
bad, we must remember that there can be other single-profile worlds with different given 
preference profiles.  So, while in some cases an innocuous dictatorship is acceptable, in 
many other cases it is very much unacceptable.  Second, we could easily get rid of the 
benign dictator who is indifferent among all alternatives by assuming away individual 
indifference.  All the arguments and theorems would remain.  Third, both of our diversity 
assumptions exclude vacuous dictatorship cases like the one in which all individuals have 
exactly the same preferences, or the one in which 3 individuals have identical preferences 
in a committee of 5, using majority rule.  In sum, even though single-profile analysis 
permits innocuous dictators, dictatorship remains a very bad thing, and Arrow’s theorem 
remains important.  
 
10.  Conclusions. 
  We have presented two new single-profile Arrow impossibility theorems which 
are simple and transparent.  The first theorem, which requires  2 = n , relies on a very 
simple and modest assumption about diversity of preferences within the given preference 
profile, and on a relatively modest neutrality assumption.  The second theorem, which 
allows  , uses a substantially more complex assumption about diversity of 
preferences within the given profile, and uses a stronger neutrality/monotonicity 
2 ≥ n
  22assumption.  Both theorems support the claim that Arrow impossibility happens even if 
individual preferences about alternatives are given and fixed. 
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